Beijing is quietly rolling out a new generation of small launchers, and one of them, the Lijian‑1, is starting to nibble at a market that US and European players thought they largely owned.
A Chinese “dump truck” for small satellites
On 27 July 2022, a solid-fuel rocket called Lijian‑1 climbed away from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in north‑west China. Standing 31 metres tall and 2.65 metres wide, it does not look like a rival to SpaceX’s hulking Falcon 9 at first glance.
Yet inside its payload fairing – the nose cone – the launcher can haul up to 2 tonnes into low Earth orbit and about 1.5 tonnes into sun‑synchronous orbit, the preferred path for Earth‑observation satellites.
Lijian‑1 gives China a compact, relatively cheap way to spray dozens of small satellites into orbit on short notice.
That hits the heart of the “light launcher” segment: rockets that carry hundreds of kilos to a few tonnes to orbit, often serving operators that want flexible, dedicated rides instead of hitching lifts on larger vehicles.
Technical profile: built for simplicity and volume
Lijian‑1 is built by CAS Space, a commercial offshoot of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Technically, it is a four‑stage, all‑solid launcher designed with a simple, modular layout:
- First stage: roughly 200 tonnes of thrust
- Second stage: around 100 tonnes of thrust
- Third stage: about 50 tonnes of thrust
- Fourth stage: about 10 tonnes of thrust for final orbit shaping
This step‑down approach allows the rocket to shed mass and adjust power as it climbs, without complex plumbing or cryogenic systems. Solid motors are cheaper to build, easier to store and can sit ready for launch for long periods.
At liftoff, Lijian‑1 weighs about 135 tonnes, making it the most powerful solid rocket in China’s fleet. That gives it a payload range comparable to Europe’s Vega family, and well above ultra‑light vehicles such as Rocket Lab’s Electron.
| Parameter | Lijian‑1 value |
|---|---|
| Height | 31 m |
| Diameter | 2.65 m |
| Liftoff mass | 135 tonnes |
| Payload to low Earth orbit | 2,000 kg |
| Payload to sun‑synchronous orbit | 1,500 kg |
| Launches by end‑2024 | 6 (5 successful, 1 failure) |
Military fingerprints all over the design
One reason Lijian‑1 appeared so quickly: it leans heavily on missile technology.
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Chinese sources and defence analysts say the first stage is closely related to the DF‑31 intercontinental ballistic missile, sharing a similar diameter and modular solid‑fuel structure. That does not mean it is simply a repurposed weapon, but the kinship is obvious.
The rocket is a fusion of civilian launch needs and mature, military‑grade missile engineering.
CAS Space was founded in 2018 with a clear mission: turn China’s decades of strategic missile and scientific know‑how into commercial launch hardware. That gives the firm access to state labs, military‑grade propulsion and a testing ecosystem that most Western start‑ups could only dream of.
For Beijing, it is an efficient way to spread the cost of its missile industry while gaining a dual‑use space infrastructure. The same industrial base that can loft climate satellites can, on a different day, support defence and intelligence payloads.
Racking up launches and foreign customers
A busy manifest for a “newcomer”
Since its debut, Lijian‑1 has not been idle. By the end of 2024, the rocket had flown six missions, with five recorded successes and one failure, giving it an 83% success rate in its early years.
One standout mission came in June 2023, when Lijian‑1 carried 26 satellites in a single shot. That figure falls short of the rideshare records set by SpaceX’s Falcon 9, but it firmly places CAS Space in the club of serious small‑satellite hauliers.
The payloads have included Earth‑observation craft, technology demonstrators and scientific platforms. Crucially, the manifest is not limited to Chinese state customers.
Among the spacecraft launched was Oman’s first remote‑sensing satellite, a signal that CAS Space is shopping its services abroad.
Attractive pricing, rapid launch slots and China’s willingness to package space cooperation with broader diplomatic deals could pull in more clients in Asia, the Middle East and Africa – regions that may find Western launch services expensive, politically sensitive or oversubscribed.
How it stacks up against SpaceX and others
Lijian‑1 does not match Falcon 9’s raw power or reusability. SpaceX’s workhorse can lift more than 20 tonnes to low Earth orbit and land its first stage for reuse, crushing per‑kilogram launch costs at high volumes.
Where the Chinese rocket bites is in the niche below that:
- Similar payload class to Europe’s Vega, but with potentially lower manufacturing and labour costs.
- Much larger capacity than ultra‑light rockets like Electron, allowing dozens of satellites on one ride.
- Solid propulsion, which favours responsiveness and simpler ground infrastructure.
For satellite operators who want a medium batch of spacecraft in a specific orbit and who are not invited onto Falcon 9’s heavily booked rideshares, a Chinese launcher with open slots and keen pricing becomes an attractive backup or even a primary option.
Beijing’s strategy: “private” firms with state backing
Lijian‑1 also reveals how China is trying to copy, and adapt, the US new‑space model. CAS Space is described as a commercial company, but it remains tightly tied to the Chinese Academy of Sciences and, by extension, state funding and state technology.
China’s space “start‑ups” often look like hybrid creatures: private on paper, plugged into the state where it matters.
President Xi Jinping has repeatedly called for rapid progress in “strategic emerging industries”, with space high on the list. The plan is to build dense constellations for communications, navigation and surveillance that lessen dependence on foreign systems and create exportable services.
In this context, Lijian‑1 is not just a Cargo truck for commercial cubesats. It is part of a toolkit for foreign policy. Offering launch access, ground‑segment partnerships and data services lets Beijing weave tighter ties with partner governments, from data‑sharing deals to joint observation programmes.
Lijian‑2 and the push into medium lift
CAS Space is already working on a bigger sibling: Lijian‑2. The new rocket is expected to loft around 12 tonnes to low Earth orbit, roughly six times the payload of Lijian‑1 and approaching the lower end of SpaceX Falcon 9’s regime, albeit without reusability.
The first test flight is officially targeted for 2025. If it flies broadly on schedule, China will gain another domestically controlled option to launch medium‑sized payloads, from government satellites to private broadband constellations and in‑orbit servicing platforms.
Lijian‑1 handles the dense traffic of small satellites; Lijian‑2 is meant to push China deeper into mainstream commercial launch.
That two‑tier approach echoes what other players are doing: Rocket Lab is developing its larger Neutron rocket, while Europe is trying to stabilise Vega and Ariane 6 after delays and failures.
Why small launchers matter more than they look
Feeding the constellation boom
The real driver behind Lijian‑1 is not prestige but numbers. Thousands of small satellites are forecast to reach orbit this decade for internet, imaging, weather and tracking services.
Large rockets like Falcon 9 can carry many of them at once, but that model suits mega‑constellation operators who control their own launch contracts. Smaller space companies, universities and states want more tailored options. They may prefer to choose their orbit, timing and co‑passengers, instead of waiting months or years for a compatible rideshare.
Lijian‑1 sits in that gap: big enough to be cost‑effective, small enough to remain flexible. Solid propulsion also allows a launcher to be stored and rolled out quickly for time‑sensitive missions, including military or disaster‑response satellites.
Risks and trade‑offs with solid rockets
Solid‑fuel launchers have their downsides. Once a solid motor is lit, it cannot be throttled or shut down. That reduces fine control and can limit performance compared with advanced liquid engines.
They also tend to generate more debris from spent stages and may release more particulate pollution in the upper atmosphere than some liquid‑fuel rivals. That is drawing more attention as spaceflight grows busier.
From a safety perspective, solid rockets demand strict handling procedures. The propellant is essentially a large block of explosive material; manufacturing flaws or ageing can cause catastrophic failures. China’s quick ramp‑up with Lijian‑1, including one mission failure already, will be watched closely by insurers and foreign customers.
Key terms and future scenarios
For readers not steeped in space jargon, a few concepts matter when judging rockets like Lijian‑1:
- Low Earth orbit (LEO) – Typically 300–1,200 km above Earth. Ideal for imaging, low‑latency communications and scientific missions.
- Sun‑synchronous orbit (SSO) – A special type of LEO where satellites pass over the same point at roughly the same local solar time, giving consistent lighting for observation.
- Solid vs liquid propulsion – Solid rockets are simpler and more storage‑friendly. Liquid rockets offer higher efficiency, throttling and reusability, but rely on complex pumps and cryogenic tanks.
Looking ahead, Lijian‑1 could underpin a few plausible scenarios. One is a more fragmented global launch market, where Western operators increasingly avoid Chinese launchers for security reasons, while a parallel ecosystem grows around Beijing with clients in the Global South.
Another is tougher price pressure on US and European small‑launch start‑ups. A state‑backed competitor with proven missile‑heritage hardware can afford slimmer margins, forcing others to specialise or consolidate.
For smaller nations and companies, that competition cuts both ways. Access to orbit could become cheaper and more varied, but tying satellite infrastructure to any single major power carries geopolitical strings. The real contest is not only about which rocket reaches space, but about who controls the data and services that come back down.
Originally posted 2026-02-18 02:00:36.