Instead, billions are stuck in limbo and patience has snapped.
Behind carefully worded diplomatic statements, Japan is now openly questioning how reliable US defence contracts really are, after years of late deliveries, moving deadlines and almost no leverage once the money was wired.
Japan’s 6.4 billion euro headache with American weapons
The trigger came from a dry but explosive document: an audit by the Japan Board of Audit, the country’s equivalent of a national public accounts watchdog.
Asked by the upper house of parliament to review US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deals signed since the 2018 fiscal year, auditors uncovered a pile of undelivered hardware.
The figure is stark: 1.1 trillion yen – about 6.4 billion euros, or nearly 7 billion dollars – tied up in 118 US arms contracts that remain at least partly undelivered, some stretching back more than five years.
Japan has already paid most of the money for many of these contracts, while key equipment either has no firm delivery date or has seen its deadline quietly pushed back.
In most cases, auditors point the finger at US defence companies responsible for building the systems on behalf of Washington. Yet the structure of the FMS system means they face no automatic penalties for falling behind.
Japan pays. Then Japan waits.
Worse, in several cases American authorities simply amended delivery dates through administrative updates, without any formal consent from Tokyo. On paper the contract lives on; in reality the schedule has shifted into a haze.
The Hawkeye that can’t be maintained properly
A flagship aircraft left without its support gear
One of the clearest examples involves the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, a high-end airborne early-warning aircraft that forms the backbone of Japanese airspace surveillance.
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These turbo-prop planes, with their distinctive radar dome, monitor Chinese and North Korean activity in the seas and skies around Japan. They are meant to stay aloft for hours and feed data to fighters, ships and ground radar.
According to the audit, key maintenance and support equipment ordered for the E-2D fleet has still not arrived years after contracts were signed.
On paper, Japan owns some of the most advanced airborne sensors in the region. In practice, keeping them fully operational is becoming a juggling act.
Aircraft technically delivered but lacking proper support equipment force crews into workarounds, extended maintenance times and fragile availability rates.
Units stretch older tools, cannibalise parts and improvise temporary fixes. That approach can keep planes flying for a while, but it raises costs, eats into training time and increases the risk of unplanned groundings.
How the FMS system tilts the table toward Washington
Indicative dates, real money
The FMS framework was sold to Tokyo as a safe channel for buying US weapons.
Instead of haggling directly with private contractors, Japan signs government‑to‑government deals with Washington. The US Department of Defense then manages procurement with American industry.
On paper, this brings political reliability, interoperability and controlled technology transfers.
The audit highlights the catch: the delivery dates in FMS paperwork are essentially “for guidance”. They do not bind Washington in the way a commercial contract would bind a supplier.
Once a partner state has paid into an FMS case, its bargaining power drops sharply; the schedule can move, while the cash stays in US accounts.
Japan is also not directly contracted with Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman or other manufacturers. It cannot threaten them with late-delivery penalties, demand detailed production data or renegotiate prioritisation.
Everything must go through the US government, which itself is facing pressure to rearm in a more dangerous global environment.
Upfront payments, long delays
The financial structure makes the problem worse. Most FMS contracts require almost full prepayment.
For Tokyo, that means large sums leave the defence budget years before a system is fielded. In accounting terms, the money is “committed”; in military terms, nothing yet flies, sails or fires.
Some projects simply stay open for years: not cancelled, not delivered, resting in a grey zone of “ongoing case” while the strategic environment around Japan hardens.
- Funds tied up in Washington instead of supporting domestic industry
- Ageing equipment kept in service longer than planned
- Maintenance costs rising along with spare parts shortages
- Operational gaps emerging in critical domains like air defence and maritime surveillance
Alliance politics versus industrial reality
Tokyo is not questioning its security alliance with the US, which remains central to its defence against China and North Korea. American forces are deployed on Japanese soil, and the two militaries train together constantly.
The audit, though, reveals a hard limit: when the US industrial base is stretched, allies fall down the queue.
Washington must first equip its own forces, from Ukraine aid packages to Pacific deployments. FMS customers come after, especially for items in short supply or on congested production lines.
Japan’s defence ministry says it has repeatedly raised the issue with US officials. Some schedules have reportedly improved, but many cases remain stuck or drifting.
Tokyo is being forced to ask an uncomfortable question: should FMS still be the default path for every radar, missile or support system, especially when delay risks are so high?
The Australian warning sign
Japan is not alone. Canberra’s experience with AUKUS submarines is another cautionary tale.
Australia scrapped a major contract for French conventional submarines in 2021 to pivot toward nuclear‑powered boats built with the US and the UK. The move redefined Australian strategy, but also locked the country into a long, uncertain industrial path.
The first AUKUS‑class submarines are unlikely to arrive before the late 2030s or early 2040s. The current Collins‑class fleet is already ageing, forcing life-extension programmes and “bridging” arrangements with the US and UK.
Japanese officials privately see strong parallels: big strategic promises, long timelines, and allies whose capabilities are stuck in transition while American and British yards reorganise.
| Country | Key US-related programme | Main concern |
|---|---|---|
| Japan | FMS contracts (air, missile, radar, support) | Delays, upfront payment, lack of leverage |
| Australia | AUKUS nuclear submarines | Very long timeline, ageing existing fleet |
Can Japan rebalance its defence supply chain?
Tokyo has already broken a long-standing taboo by raising its defence budget to record levels and loosening some self‑imposed constraints on military exports.
Now, the audit gives ammunition to those arguing Japan should invest far more aggressively in its own defence industrial base and in diversified partnerships with Europe and parts of Asia.
That might mean producing more missiles at home, co‑developing radars with European groups, or sourcing some support equipment from allied suppliers that can meet firmer deadlines.
None of this is quick. Building modern defence manufacturing capacity takes years, specialised skills and political willingness to accept higher costs in the short term.
Japan faces a classic trade-off: stay dependent on a powerful but overstretched ally, or pay the price of building more strategic autonomy.
Key concepts behind the tension
What is Foreign Military Sales?
Foreign Military Sales is a US programme through which Washington sells weapons and services to allied governments.
Instead of a foreign ministry or defence department signing directly with Lockheed Martin or Raytheon, they sign with the US government. The Pentagon then places orders with companies on their behalf.
Advantages usually cited include political guarantees, standardised equipment with US forces, and smoother technology transfer approvals.
The downside, as Japan’s case illustrates, lies in limited contractual control and weak recourse when schedules slip.
Operational risk versus financial risk
Two types of risk are colliding here.
Financial risk comes from billions locked in prepayments with no clear delivery schedule. That money cannot be reallocated easily to other urgent projects, including domestic ones.
Operational risk stems from gaps in real-world capability. If spare parts for an early‑warning aircraft are late, that affects how often it can fly patrols. If new missiles arrive years behind schedule, older systems must remain in use beyond their ideal lifespan.
Both risks compound. The longer delays run, the more Tokyo spends maintaining ageing systems and patching holes, while also losing flexibility to invest in alternatives.
What could change in practice for future deals?
Defence officials and lawmakers in Japan are now floating several practical ideas, short of ripping up the alliance playbook.
- Demanding clearer, binding delivery milestones for critical support equipment
- Limiting prepayment levels or tying part of the payment to on-time delivery
- Using FMS mainly for complex platforms, while sourcing spares and support tools via more flexible arrangements
- Investing in domestic production lines that can handle maintenance kits, software updates and some missile types
A possible scenario often discussed in Tokyo’s strategic circles is a mixed approach: buy a smaller number of high‑end US systems through FMS, but pair them with a larger ecosystem of locally produced or co‑developed gear that Japan can control more tightly.
This kind of layered procurement would not end dependence on US technology, especially in areas like stealth or advanced sensors, but it could reduce the kind of “heads I win, tails you lose” feeling now bubbling to the surface in Tokyo’s latest audit report.
Originally posted 2026-02-15 14:11:37.