In late May 2025, two Chinese aircraft carrier strike groups operated together deep in the western Pacific, beyond the usual range of Beijing’s navy. What looked like a routine training mission has turned into one of the most unsettling signals yet for strategists in Tokyo, Washington and across the region.
China’s carriers push past the second island chain
Between 25 and 29 May 2025, China sent its two operational aircraft carriers – CNS Liaoning and CNS Shandong – and their escorts into waters east of Taiwan and south of Japan, more than 600 nautical miles from the US territory of Guam.
They did not sneak there. Their routes were deliberate and theatrical.
The Liaoning group moved through the Miyako Strait, a narrow gap between the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako, escorted by a pack of modern warships: two Type 055 destroyers, two Type 052D destroyers, one Type 054A frigate and two large replenishment ships of the Type 901 and 903A classes.
At roughly the same time, Shandong sailed through the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines with a comparable screen of destroyers, frigates and a fast support vessel, aiming for the lonely Japanese atoll of Okinotorishima in the wider Pacific.
China’s navy did not just venture further than ever before; it operated like a blue-water fleet that plans to stay there.
Strategists refer to a series of “island chains” that structure US and allied control of the Pacific. The first runs through Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. The second stretches out toward Guam. By pushing two carrier groups beyond that second line, Beijing signalled it no longer sees that boundary as a barrier.
Intensive flight operations in contested skies
Once on station, Liaoning’s air wing went into overdrive. Over four days, around 260 take-offs and landings were recorded from the carrier, including J-15 fighter jets and anti-submarine helicopters. The aircraft flew sorties near Japanese, Taiwanese and Philippine airspace, testing reactions and gathering data.
Civilian satellite imagery captured a rare sight: the hulking supply ship Hulunhu refuelling Liaoning at speed near the Ryukyu Islands. Japan scrambled F-15 and F-35 fighters and shadowed the formation with surface ships as it skirted its exclusive economic zone without crossing into territorial waters.
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The Shandong group was just as active. Its fighters and helicopters carried out repeated patrols, while the escorts rehearsed manoeuvres in waters heavily monitored by US and Japanese radars and submarines.
| Carrier group | Key escorts | Main operating area | Flight activity (25–29 May) |
|---|---|---|---|
| CNS Liaoning | 2× Type 055, 2× Type 052D, 1× Type 054A, 2× supply ships | North-east of Guam, near Japan’s EEZ | 260 sorties |
| CNS Shandong | 1× Type 055, 1× Type 052D, 2× Type 054A, 1× support ship | South of Okinotorishima | Approx. 150 sorties (estimated) |
The real message: challenging US containment at sea
The timing of this operation was not accidental. Two US nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, USS Nimitz and USS George Washington, were also cruising in the wider region. For a brief moment, four large carriers – two American, two Chinese – were operating inside the same contested theatre.
Since the Cold War, Washington has leaned on a strategy of layered island chains to box in potential rivals and to secure its ability to project power. Those arcs of islands host bases, airfields, radars and missile batteries, turning them into unsinkable aircraft carriers.
Beijing has long complained that this architecture amounts to a maritime cage. With this deployment, it effectively rattled the bars.
By sailing beyond the second island chain with two carriers and full logistical support, China showed it can punch outward and sustain a fight far from home.
The presence of modern supply ships – particularly the large Type 901 fast replenishment vessels – matters as much as the carriers themselves. They allow Chinese task forces to refuel, rearm and repair at sea without needing to run back to Hainan or the mainland, reducing reliance on nearby ports that could be blockaded or struck in a conflict.
Exercises that look a lot like a Taiwan blockade
The Pacific foray was not a one-off gesture. Since April 2025, Shandong has played a starring role in increasingly aggressive drills around Taiwan.
During an exercise labelled “Strait Thunder 2025A”, the carrier reportedly approached within about 45 kilometres of Taiwan’s coastline. It was backed by a heavy escort that included the giant Type 055 destroyer Xianyang, two Type 052D destroyers, four Type 054A frigates and a Type 901 support ship.
In the air, China mixed carrier-based J-15 and electronic warfare J-15D fighters with land-based J-16 and Russian-built Su-30MKK jets. H-6K bombers practised long-range strike profiles, while KJ-500 airborne early-warning aircraft orchestrated the traffic overhead.
On land, missile brigades drilled simulated attacks on ports, fuel depots and air-traffic control hubs. Rocket artillery units fired salvos intended to mimic strikes on critical Taiwanese infrastructure.
- Ports and naval bases were treated as priority targets.
- Air defence nodes and radar sites were targeted to blind response forces.
- Fuel and logistics hubs were “hit” to slow mobilisation.
Taken together, these moves resemble a rehearsal for a blockade campaign designed to squeeze Taiwan while deterring outside forces, rather than an immediate amphibious invasion.
Fujian: the third giant waiting in the wings
While Liaoning and Shandong were making waves in the Pacific, a third, more advanced carrier was edging toward frontline service back in China.
The CNS Fujian, now China’s largest and most sophisticated carrier, conducted its first electromagnetic catapult launch of a J-35 stealth fighter in March 2025 from a shipyard area near Shanghai.
Unlike its older sisters, which rely on ski-jump ramps, Fujian uses three electromagnetic catapults. This allows heavier aircraft and fully fuelled jets to take off, extending range and payload, and brings its design closer to the latest American systems.
The ship displaces more than 85,000 tonnes and is expected to operate a mixed air wing of roughly 48 aircraft, including:
- J-35 stealth fighters for strike and air superiority
- Upgraded J-15 variants
- KJ-600 carrier-based airborne early-warning planes
- GJ-11 combat drones and other unmanned systems
Chinese planners have hinted that by 2030 they want as many as 100 carrier-capable stealth fighters in service, and that older carriers might be retrofitted to operate J-35s despite their ski-jump decks.
US response: turning Guam into a fortified hub
Washington is not standing still. The US is rapidly hardening Guam, long a key air and naval hub, into something closer to a heavily defended bastion.
By 2035, the island is slated to host 16 missile-defence sites under a project known as Aegis Guam. Led by defence contractor Lockheed Martin, the system will knit together a powerful TPY-6 radar, SM‑3 and SM‑6 interceptor missiles and vertical-launch systems similar to those already used on US warships.
At the same time, the US Marine Corps has started deploying NMESIS coastal missile batteries to the Philippine islands of Batanes, near the Luzon Strait. In May 2025, they rehearsed sea-denial missions as a Chinese carrier group moved through the same channel.
The Pentagon’s emerging concept, sometimes called a “kill web”, aims to connect satellites, drones, ships, aircraft and missile batteries so that any Chinese ship or aircraft can be targeted quickly from multiple directions.
The idea is to replace a few large, vulnerable assets with a mesh of smaller, networked systems that can keep operating even after taking losses.
Why the second island chain matters so much
For non-specialists, the language of “island chains” can sound abstract. In practice, these chains are bands of territory where access, logistics and politics overlap.
The first island chain, close to the Asian mainland, is where China feels most cornered, ringed by US allies. The second, running through Guam, gives the US space to pull back and still launch strikes. When Chinese carriers steam beyond that line, they signal that US bases there are no longer comfortably out of reach.
In a crisis, this would force American commanders to disperse their forces even more, complicating planning and stretching already thin logistics. It also raises questions for allies like Japan and the Philippines, which depend on timely US support.
Possible crisis scenarios in the western Pacific
Security analysts are running through a range of scenarios, none of them neat or tidy. A few stand out:
- Slow strangulation of Taiwan: China uses its carriers and missile forces to enforce inspections or “quarantines” of shipping, avoiding a direct landing but steadily choking trade.
- Missile and drone swarms on Guam: Large salvos of ballistic and cruise missiles, possibly paired with drones, test the limits of Aegis Guam in a first wave of a confrontation.
- Dangerous encounters at sea: Close passes, unplanned manoeuvres and aggressive intercepts between Chinese, US and allied ships or aircraft increase the risk of miscalculation.
None of these scenarios require a formal declaration of war. They sit in what defence experts call the “grey zone”: actions that are coercive and sometimes violent, but carefully calibrated to stay below the threshold of open conflict.
For civilians, the consequences could still be serious. Shipping lanes might be disrupted, insurance costs could spike, and undersea data cables could become targets. Airlines would reroute around risk zones, adding time and cost to travel between Asia and North America.
Key terms readers will hear again
Several technical phrases that appear in military reports around this episode are likely to feature more often in coming years:
- Blue-water navy: A fleet capable of operating globally, far from its home ports, with its own logistics and air cover.
- Carrier strike group: An aircraft carrier plus its destroyers, frigates, submarines and support ships, all working as a single combat unit.
- EEZ (exclusive economic zone): A band of sea up to 200 nautical miles from a country’s coast where it has rights over resources, but where foreign navies can still sail.
- Catapult-assisted take-off: A launch system that flings aircraft off a carrier deck, letting them carry more fuel and weapons than ski-jump designs.
As China’s navy grows more confident and the US and its allies reinforce their Pacific positions, these once-specialist terms are seeping into mainstream debate. Two Chinese carriers operating beyond Guam’s line of comfort will not be the last headline moment in this unfolding contest.