Two decades after dismantling much of its explosives industry, the United Kingdom is shifting direction, planning a dense network of new munitions and drone factories designed for prolonged, high‑intensity warfare and long‑term support to Ukraine.
Britain’s quiet return to a war economy
Across the UK, 13 sites have been earmarked to restart production of explosives, propellants and pyrotechnics. These are the basic ingredients that keep artillery, missiles and guided weapons firing day after day.
The locations stretch from Scotland to Wales, with three pilot hubs already standing out:
- Grangemouth in central Scotland
- Teesside in north‑east England
- Milford Haven in south‑west Wales
The goal is not a symbolic revival. London wants to rebuild an industrial base capable of producing munitions in bulk, year after year, rather than scrambling for emergency imports every time a crisis erupts.
Rebuilding explosives production is less about prestige and more about survival: without shells, rockets and charges, even a modern army quickly becomes hollow.
The turnaround is sharp. In the early 2000s, successive governments judged heavy munitions plants as legacy assets from the Cold War. Today, the invasion of Ukraine and rising tensions with Russia and China have made those assumptions look dangerously optimistic.
£1.5 billion for “energetics” and a new munitions pipeline
Defence Secretary John Healey has framed the decision in blunt language, promising to “rebuild the factories of the future in Britain” and warning against slipping back into “hollowed‑out” armed forces.
At the core of the plan is a £1.5 billion (about €1.7 billion) package focused on so‑called energetics. This is the defence‑industry term for all the energetic materials that power weapons systems:
- Explosives used in artillery shells, bombs and warheads
- Propellants that push rockets, missiles and tank rounds
- Pyrotechnic charges and fuses that trigger detonation
- Specialised powders tailored to different guns and calibres
The government’s stated aims go well beyond short‑term rearmament.
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The plan is to build a permanent munitions pipeline for UK forces, while sustaining Ukraine’s war effort without relying on fragile foreign supply chains.
Officials say the programme should create at least 1,000 direct jobs and support a much larger ecosystem of subcontractors, from chemical producers to precision engineering firms. Engineers have already begun designing the first production lines, while feasibility studies map out which materials Britain must bring back onshore.
Where the money is going
The shift is part of a broader surge in defence‑related investment. Alongside the munitions push, London is spending on drones and on widening its overall industrial base.
| Area | Investment (approx.) | Main purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Energetics and munitions | £1.5 billion (€1.7 billion) | Restart explosive, propellant and charge production |
| New drone factories (Plymouth & Swindon) | £250 million (€280 million) | Scale up autonomous and unmanned systems |
| Annual “Invest” defence industry budget | ≈ £11 billion (€12.5 billion) | Expand the UK defence industrial base |
| 2024 Ministry of Defence procurement | £31.7 billion (€35 billion) | Support UK‑based defence companies |
One technical document will quietly shape the whole effort: the Planned Procurement Note. This upcoming paper will spell out exactly which materials the UK wants to secure at home, including nine “critical energetics” seen as non‑negotiable for national autonomy.
Drones join the mix: Plymouth and Swindon get new plants
Parallel to the explosives push, two new drone factories are being set up, signalling how much the character of warfare has shifted since Britain last operated this kind of munitions industry.
- In Plymouth, defence tech firm Helsing is building what it calls a “resilience factory” focused on scalable drone production.
- In Swindon, STARK is launching a dedicated line for unmanned systems.
The combined project is backed by about £250 million, aimed at churning out thousands of drones for reconnaissance, targeting and direct strikes. British officials have watched Ukraine’s widespread use of small, cheap unmanned systems and drawn a clear lesson: air power is no longer only about fast jets and large, expensive platforms.
From artillery shells to loitering munitions, the UK is trying to build an ecosystem where explosives and drones are designed and produced side by side.
The timing is deliberate. Washington is pressuring European allies to carry a larger share of the security burden, while Russia is retooling its economy for prolonged confrontation. London wants to show it can adapt at industrial speed, not just through strategy papers.
Jobs, regions and the politics of rearmament
The defence sector already supports more than 460,000 jobs in the UK, including about 24,000 apprentices trained with Ministry of Defence support. Roughly 70% of these positions sit outside London, in regions that have often struggled with deindustrialisation.
New explosives and drone plants fit neatly into that political narrative. Areas like Teesside and Milford Haven have long histories in chemicals, heavy industry and energy. Reusing that know‑how for high‑end defence production lets ministers talk about both security and “levelling up” in the same breath.
The move is also meant to shield the UK from future export bottlenecks. During the first years of the Ukraine war, several European states discovered that their munitions contracts relied on a small number of overseas suppliers, some of which could not or would not ramp up production quickly.
London’s new doctrine rests on a simple idea: if you cannot make key munitions yourself, you cannot plan for a long war.
How France compares, and why Britain had more ground to make up
Across the Channel, France has also been boosting defence industry spending, but from a different starting point. Paris never fully dismantled its explosives and powder plants. Companies such as Eurenco in Bergerac, NobelSport in Pont‑de‑Buis and SNPE Matériaux Énergétiques have kept producing critical components, albeit at modest volumes.
The French government now allocates around €5–6 billion per year to stocks and munitions under its 2024‑2030 defence spending law. Yet there is still no single, highly publicised programme centered specifically on a nationwide “high‑cadence munitions” network.
Britain, by contrast, is essentially rebuilding from near zero in some areas. That explains the highly visible push for 13 new factories and the emphasis on fully domestic supply chains for chemicals and energetics.
What “energetics” actually means
For non‑specialists, the term can sound abstract. In practice, energetics cover three broad families:
- Primary explosives – extremely sensitive compounds used to initiate a detonation, often inside fuses.
- Secondary explosives – more stable materials that form the bulk of a warhead or shell, such as modern plastic‑bonded explosives.
- Propellants – powders and solid fuels that create gas pressure or thrust for guns, missiles and rockets.
Producing them involves complex chemistry, tight environmental rules and high safety standards. Many Western countries gradually outsourced or downsized these capabilities after the Cold War, assuming large‑scale state‑on‑state warfare was fading into history.
Risks, trade‑offs and what a “war economy” looks like in practice
Rearming at this scale carries plenty of risks. The UK must manage hazardous industrial processes, secure steady supplies of precursor chemicals and persuade local communities that new plants will be tightly regulated and worth the disruption.
There is also the risk of overcorrecting. If today’s security fears ease in a decade, future governments could face pressure to mothball facilities all over again. The challenge is to build an industrial base flexible enough to shift between military and civilian demand, rather than a rigid system that only survives in permanent crisis.
The phrase “war economy” can sound dramatic, but in this context it mostly means three things:
- Long‑term, predictable contracts for industry, not short, stop‑start orders.
- Prioritising defence in national budgets even when social and health spending are under strain.
- Accepting higher stockpiles of munitions as a permanent feature, not a temporary surge.
For Ukraine, the implications are immediate. If the UK delivers on its plans, Kyiv gains a reliable European source of shells, explosives and drones at a time when US support is increasingly shaped by domestic politics. For Britain, the wager is harsher: spend more now on factories and chemistry, in the hope that the capability they enable never needs to be used at full scale.